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Introduction 
In the recent events of today’s politics in the post-Soviet region, we have witnessed re-emerging 
ethno-national conflicts that have direct connections to the Soviet legacy of displaced nations. 
For this study the Crimean Tatar case is used as an example of a formerly exiled nation. Since 
the fall of the Soviet Union, the Crimean Tatars repatriated to the geopolitically attractive region 
of the Crimean peninsula, the territory that they have claimed to be their ancestral homeland. 
Russia has recently incorporated the Crimean Autonomous Republic once again and it only 
seems that history is repeating itself.
1
 New problems re-occur between the Crimean Tatars, the 
local Russian population and the Russian political hegemony. However, it appears so that the 
Crimean Tatars will never give up their national territory. 
 
The Crimean Tatar nation is exclusive in its own nature because of its dramatic history. There 
were two major events in recent history that had changed the Crimean Tatar national identity; 
these were deportation from their territory in Crimea (1944) and repatriation to Crimea, slightly 
before and after the Soviet disintegration (1989-1994). The formation of the Soviet Union in the 
1920s allowed nations to have political and cultural spheres of influences. In this period the 
Crimean Tatars strengthened their national consciousness in their territorial autonomy in Crimea. 
Yet the Second World War was a major turning point for the Crimean Tatars because they were 
accused of collaborating with the Germans. For several reasons, the Crimean Tatars (along with 
a few other nations) were deported to Central Asia. The deportation of Crimean Tatars became a 
threat to their rights to self-determination. Not only did their misplacement cause a threat to their 
national identity, but more deprivations were imposed on the Crimean Tatars that threatened 
their right to return to Crimea. Loss in territory and name could have permitted the group in 
destruction of their ethnos. From their perception, the Soviet state attempted to destroy their 
nation, but instead achieved opposite results. During their exile, the Crimean Tatars became 
more aware of their national identity and strengthened the determination to return to their 
homeland in the Crimean peninsula. It will become more apparent in this thesis that the Crimean 
Tatars became more self-conscious during a ‘nation-destruction’ process. Almost instinctively, 
the nation begins to mobilize and combat the system that is ‘destroying’ it, in order to preserve 
                                                 
1
 Russia annexed Crimea in 1783 for the first time.  
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its right to self-determination. Within these different historical episodes, the Crimean Tatars 
claim to have learned to become radical, solidary, political and very well organized.
2
 After 
surviving the Soviet pressure not to return to Crimea, the Soviet disintegration gave them the 
opportunity to repatriate to Crimea. Since then they continue their nation-building process and 
believe that their future remains in the Crimean peninsula. 
 
The purpose of this thesis, through the case study of the Crimean Tatars, is to exemplify the 
strengthening of national identity by ethnic groups that have been formerly displaced by the 
Soviet Union. To what extent has Crimean Tatar national identity been strengthened as a result 
of deportation by the Soviet Union and repatriation after that? Deportation and repatriation is 
used to answer the question about the shaping of national identity of the Crimean Tatars. A 
constructivist approach is taken to explain how the national identity has evolved. Looking at the 
process of how the Crimean Tatar national identity has developed, helps us understand the 
current problems that occur between the Crimean Tatars and Russians in Crimea. The findings in 
this research will clarify why the Crimean Tatars have returned to Crimea and how this 
experience has formed their national identity. 
 
This thesis begins with the literature review, theoretical framework and research methodology. 
The second chapter provides an ethnographical description of the Crimean Tatar population in a 
pre-modern era. It also explores the formation of the Crimean Tatar nation in the late 19
th
 until 
the beginning of 20
th
 century. The third chapter is about Soviet nation-building and nation-
destruction processes of the Crimean Tatar nation. In this chapter the deportation of the Crimean 
Tatars is introduced. It elaborates on the social, political and cultural effects it had on the 
Crimean Tatars and what it meant for their national identity. Afterwards, the thesis continues into 
analyzing the Tatars’ reaction against the Soviet authorities in the form of a national movement. 
The Crimean Tatar national movement and the Soviet disintegration had direct influence on the 
repatriation of the Crimean Tatars. The last chapters explore the aftermath of the Soviet 
disintegration, the repatriation process, and adaption of the Crimean Tatars in Crimea. The thesis 
is finalized with the results, discussion and conclusion.  
                                                 
2
 Gubogol, M. N. & Chervonnaya, S. M. Krymskotatarskoye Natsionalnoye Dvizheniye [The  
Crimean Tatar National Movement] (TsIMTO, Moscow. 1992), p. 4. 
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Chapter I: Research 
Literature review  
One of the most discussed topics in literature, among historians like Aleksandr Nekrich and 
Edward Lazzerini, concerning the Crimean Tatars and their history is the problem of 
insufficiency of sources and gaps in social, political and economic developments of nationalities 
in the Soviet Union.
3
  
 
Among many other, the most notable experts on the Crimean Tatar history during the formation 
of the Soviet Union are Dr. Edige Kirimal, Alan Fisher, Hakim Kirimal and Edward Allworth.
4
 
A Crimean Tatar intelligentsia, Dr. Edige Kirimal wrote about the Crimean Tatars in the first 
half of the 20
th
 century. According to the International Committee for Crimea, Kirimal was one 
of the first researchers to explore ethnic minorities in the Soviet Union.
5
 Edige Kirimal has been 
mentioned in most historical books on the Crimean Tatars because he was directly involved with 
the Crimean Tatar national movement in the 1920s and played a role on helping Crimean Tatar 
refugees during the Second World War.
6
 Another notable researcher on the Crimean Tatar 
history is Alan Fisher. Fisher was one of the first Western scholars to have made an extensive 
work on the five-hundred years of Crimean Tatar history. He has used Russian, Turkish, Polish 
and Tatar documents and samizdat
7
 to support his research. Fisher explored Crimea, trying to 
                                                 
3
 Nekrich, M. Aleksandr. The Punished Peoples. Translated by George Saunders. (New York: Norton &  
Company, 1978); Alexeyeva, Ludmilla. Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious,    
and Human Rights. (Middletown: Wesleyan University, 1985); Lazzerini, Edward. J. (1998). [Review of the book 
National Movement and National Identity among the Crimean Tatars (1905-1916]. (International Journal of Middle 
East Studies, 30(1), 161-163. Published by: Cambridge University Press Article Stable URL: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/164229 
4
 Kirimal, Edige. Der nationale Kampf der Krimturken. (Verlag Lechte, Emsdetten, 1952); Fisher, Alan. The 
Crimean Tatars. (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1978); Allworth, Edward. The Tatars of Crimea: Return to the 
Homeland. Ed. E. A. Allworth. 2nd ed. (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1998). 
5
 Edige Kirimal was born in Crimea (1911) and he was involved in the Crimean Tatar nationalist activities (most 
probably during the Soviet occupation in Crimea) but he soon fled the peninsula at the turn of 1920s. He first fled to 
Azerbaijan, Iran, and Turkey and by 1939 he left to Berlin. There he attempted to secure rights for the Crimean 
Tatar refugees to settle in German camps. After the Second World War he pursued his studies in Munich where he 
wrote his monograph Der nationale Kampf der Krimturken (1951) and joined the Institute for Study of the USSR. 
Source: Bowman, Inci. (n.d.). ‘Edige Mustafa Kirimal (1911-1980)’. Retrieved on 20 July, 2014 from the 
International Committee for Crimea Website: http://www.iccrimea.org/historical/edigekirimal.html 
6
 Idem. 
7
 Samizdat  literally means “self-published”. It was a dissident activity when censored information or documentation 
was passed from hand to hand during the Soviet Union. 
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retrieve the true history of the Crimean Tatars.
8
 However, academic specialist in Central 
Eurasian Studies, Edward Lazzerini considers that particularly Western historians did not have 
access to the region and (proper) documentation Cold War.
9
 He claims that after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, scholars have had better opportunities to have access to do fieldwork and 
research archival documentation in centers such as Memorial and Central State Archives of 
Crimea (TsGAKr) (located in Simferopol).
10
 Hakim Kirimal was one of the first scholars in post-
Soviet Union who made an extensive research on the Crimean Tatars beginning of the 20
th
 
century in his book, National Movements and National Identity among the Crimean Tatars 
(1905-1916).
11
 Similarly, Edward Allworth also followed these steps in collecting documents 
and interviews from the Crimean Tatars and on the formation of their national identity.
12
 These 
researchers contribute in exploring the formation of the Crimean Tatar national identity, before 
the deportation of Crimean Tatars (1944).  
 
However, since the focus of this thesis is to analyze the national identity of the Crimean Tatars 
from the deportation by the Soviets until their repatriation to Crimea, the main focus of this 
research based on recent works. For example, Soviet dissidents and historians Aleksandr Nekrich 
and Ludmilla Alexeyeva focused more on the situation of displaced nations at the time of the 
Soviet Union in the 1970s. They argue that before glasnost
13
, the Soviet academics did not 
discuss the nationality experiences under the Soviet regime. Archival materials were not open to 
the public and literature was censored by the Soviet state.
14
   
 
Only after glasnost was implemented, researchers had full access to archives and gained 
information about exiled nations. Furthermore, the Soviet disintegration gave access to travelling 
                                                 
8
 Alan, Fisher W. The Tatars of Crimea, Return to the Homeland. (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1978). 
9
 Lazzerini, Edward. J. (1998). [Review of the book National Movement and National Identity among the  
Crimean Tatars (1905-1916]. (International Journal of Middle East Studies, 30(1), 161-163. Published by: 
Cambridge University Press Article Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/164229 
10
 Idem. 
11
 Kirimli, Hakan. National Movements and National Identity among the Crimean Tatars (1905-1916).  
(Leiden: Brill. 1996). 
12
 Allworth, Edward. (1998), pp. 1-27. 
13
 Introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev, Glasnost was a policy that introduced transparency of governmental activities 
to the society in the Soviet Union.   
14
  Nekrich, M. Aleksandr. The Punished Peoples. Translated by George Saunders. (New York: Norton &  
Company, 1978); Alexeyeva, Ludmilla. Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious,    
and Human Rights. (Middletown: Wesleyan University, 1985). 
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and archival documentation, which brought more possibilities for the Crimean Tatars to discover 
their past.
15
 The new material became an eye-opener for understanding the numerous 
misconceptions of Soviet history. So far, researchers attempted to revive the history of the 
Crimean.
16
  
 
Yet recent studies focus more on the repatriation process of the Crimean Tatars and their 
adaptation in Crimea. For instance, Gubolgo & Chernovannaya have researched the Crimean 
Tatar national movement in the second half of the Soviet Union, due to the availability of new 
data that helped determine the position of displaced nationalities in the new ethno-political 
arena.
17
 Moreover, multiple reports have been made by various NGOs and organizations, such as 
the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO), Minority Rights Group and the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation Organization (OSCE). An example of research that is 
closely related to this study is from Greta Uehling, Yulia Biletska and Zaloznaya & Gerber 
analyze how ‘memory’ can be used to consolidate a national movement and to preserve a 
national identity under an oppressive regime.
18
  
 
Different methods have been used when studying the repatriation and adaption processes. The 
research on these recent events is based on data collection from fieldworks. For example, 
Russian researchers from the Russian Institute of Oriental studies, Kul’pin and Vyatkin, have 
conducted an extensive field work in Crimea in 1992-1996, investigating the Crimean Tatars’ 
                                                 
15
 The Tatars of Crimea: Return to the Homeland. Ed. E. A. Allworth. 2nd ed. (Durham and London: Duke  
University Press, 1998).  
16
 Idem; Lazzerini, J. Edward. Ismail Bey Gasprinskii (Gaspirali): ‘The Discourse of Modernism and the  
Russians’. In The Tatars of Crimea: Return to the Homeland. Ed. E. A. Allworth. 2nd ed. (Durham and London: 
Duke University Press, 1998); Williams, Brian G. (1997). ‘A community reimagined. The role of “homeland” in the 
forging of national identity: the case study of the Crimean Tatars’. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 17:2; 
Kirimal, Edige. Der nationale Kampf der Krimturken. (Verlag Lechte, Emsdetten, 1952); Kirimli, Hakan. National 
Movements and National Identity among the Crimean Tatars (1905-1916). (Leiden: Brill, 1996); Fisher, Alan. The 
Crimean Tatars. (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1978). 
17
 Gubogol, M. N. & Chervonnaya, S. M. (1992).  
18
 Uehling, Greta. ‘Social Memory as Collective Action: The Crimean Tatar National Movement’. In  
Globalizations and Social Movements: Culture, Power and the Transnational Public Sphere.  
edited by John A. Guidry, Michael D. Kennedy and Mayer N. Zald. (University of Michigan Press, USA, 2000); 
Biletska, Yulia. (n.d.). ‘Politics of Memory in the process of shaping ethnic identity of Crimean Tatars,  
Russians and Ukrainians in Crimea’; Zaloznaya Marina & Gerber P. Theodore (June 2012). ‘Migration as a Social 
Movement: Voluntary Group Migration and the Crimean Tatar Repatriation’. Population and Development Review 
38:2, 259–284.  
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problem to repatriate.
19
 The research was conducted with cross-disciplinary studies of humanities 
and natural science called ‘Social Natural History’ (SNH).20 Greta Uehling, Ismail Aydıngu¨n 
and Ays¸egu¨l Aydıngu¨n have also done extensive fieldworks by conducting interviews with 
Crimean Tatars.
21
 Here, the researchers focused on understanding the Crimean Tatar cultural 
identity and their relationships with other ethnicities.
22
 The accessibility of sources and new 
methods of research allow researchers to find the missing gaps in the history of the Crimean 
Tatar national identity.  
 
However, the literature so far has failed to look extensively into the effect that the processes of 
deportation and repatriation themselves have on national identity. However, with the available 
sources and fieldworks made on subjects related to this study, it is therefore possible to measure 
whether deportation and repatriation have strengthened Crimean Tatar national identity.   
Theoretical framework 
This chapter aims at conceptualizing terms that describe how the Crimean Tatars (as a collective 
of individuals) are identified throughout historical events. The Crimean Tatars are identified 
either as an ethnic group or a nation, depending on the circumstances (e.g. deportation and 
repatriation) that affected their national identity. This framework uses the constructivist approach 
to analyze how the Crimean Tatars national identity has evolved through the deportation and 
repatriation processes.  
 
The terms conceptualized here are ethnic group and nation. Professor E. Kul’pin from Institute of 
Oriental Studies describes ethnic group (based on SNH methodology) as a community, 
comprised of individuals that have common values and a weltanschauung that has formed since 
their ancestors.
23
 He explains that this community has evolved through stability and time and that 
                                                 
19
 Krymskie Tatary: problem repatriatsii. [Crimean Tatars: Problems of Repatriation] Ed. A. Vjakin and E.  
Kulpin. (Moskva: Institut vostokovedenija RAN [Moscow: Institute of Oriental Studies RAN], 1997), p. 5 
20
 Idem. 
21
 Aydıngu¨n, Ismail & Aydıngu¨n, Ays¸egu¨l (2007). ‘Crimean Tatars Return Home: Identity and  
Cultural Revival’. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. Vol. 33, No. 1, pp. 113-128; Uehling, Greta Lynn. 
(2001). ‘The Crimean Tatars in Uzbekistan: speaking with the dead and living homeland.’ Central Asian Survey, 
20:3, pp. 391-404; Uehling, Greta Lynn. (2001). ‘The Crimean Tatars in Uzbekistan: speaking with the dead and 
living homeland.’ Central Asian Survey, 20:3, pp. 391-404. 
22
 Idem.  
23
 E. S. Kul’pin. (1997), p. 38.  
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it is conscious about its territory. An individual of an ethnic group knows its association with the 
group. Instinctively, the ethnic community wants to achieve safety, harmony and integrity, and 
fulfill individual self-consciousness in a system that has already created values.
24
 An ethnic 
group is also a closed system, in which individuals can identify their own characteristics, which 
will be different from other ethnic groups (e.g. language, culture).
25
  
 
Unlike the term ethnic group, Robert Kaiser, a geographer, defines nation as a group that adds a 
deeper value to the ancestry, territory and common future goals.
26
 Also, Ismail and Ays¸egu¨l 
Aydıngu¨n suggest that once an ethnic group achieves a strong national consciousness, then it 
can be considered a nation, even if it is missing its territory or state.
27
 However there are 
differences in opinions among scholars about the importance of territory when differentiating 
nation from ethnic group. For instance, Suny and Martin argue that in discourse about nation it is 
about territorial control and sovereignty. The Crimean Tatars have identified themselves (and 
institutionalized themselves through Soviet nationality policy) as a nation and with Crimea as 
their territory, since the beginning of 20
th
 century. 
 
Even so, before the Russian revolution (1917), the ‘less developed’ ethnic heterogeneous clans 
and tribes would not identify themselves with a nation, but rather with the territory they 
considered to be their homeland.
 28
 Yet it was the intelligentsia that began composing its nation.
29
 
Right after the Russian revolution, the Bolsheviks had formulated national self-consciousness of 
non-Russian ethnic groups to gain their support in building a socialist state. The Soviet policies 
of indigenization actually forced social mobilization and enhanced nationalization of ethnic 
groups among non-Russians.
30
 According to Kaiser, indigenization (korenizatsiia)
31
 increased 
                                                 
24
 Idem. 
25
 E. S. Kul’pin. (1997), p. 39.  
26
 Kaiser, Robert J. Geography of Nationalism in Russian and the USSR. (New Jersey: Princeton University  
Press, 1994),  p. 6. 
27
 Ismail Aydıngu¨n and Ays¸egu¨l Aydıngu¨n. (2007), p. 116. 
28
 Idem, p. 135. 
29
 This is often the opinion from school of thought of constructivists (e.g. Ernest Geller and Benedict Anderson) that 
nations are not real or objective but constructed by elites. Walicki, Andrzej. (1998). ‘Ernest Gellner and the 
“Constructivist” Theory of Nation’. Cultures and Nations of Central and Eastern Europe. Harvard Ukrainian 
Research Institute. Vol. 22, pp. 611-619.  
30
 Idem. 
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the “sense of exclusiveness in the homeland” of the ethnic groups by gaining national territorial 
autonomy.
32
 Kaiser explains that ‘territory’ became an essential asset to the nationalization 
process.
33
 In pursuit of this development, the Crimean Tatars’ self-consciousness about national-
territory remained acute until this day. However, not only did the Soviets promote the 
significance of their territory, but they also institutionalized the social and cultural forms of the 
ethnic nationalities and put them in a social category according to ethnic nationality.
34
 
 
Another way of defining nation is with a constructivist approach. Benedict Anderson’s definition 
of nation is “an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and 
sovereign”.35 He argues that a population imagines its members and the scope of community and 
that it is constructed. The reason, Anderson claims, is that members will never know everyone in 
their community. Yet they imagine their connection. A nation seeks sovereignty to pursue 
freedom from other nations.
36
 Sovereign nations always give “political expression about the 
immemorial past, limitless future and even eternity”.37  
 
However, sociologist Roger Brubaker considers that the latter definitions of nation are more of a 
developmental occurrence.
38
 He believes that a nation cannot be described as an entity, but as a 
“contingent event”.39 Brubaker argues that, first of all, nationalism flourishes at the height of 
political events, political changes or external influences. Therefore it is not initially instigated by 
nations (on their own) (e.g. changes in Soviet policies).
40
 In other words, external forces instigate 
nationalism and nationalism is then induced by the nation. Secondly, when the feeling of 
nationalism occurs, the nation begins to express its will for independence and autonomy. 
                                                                                                                                                             
31
 Indigenization or korenizatsiia was a Soviet nationalities policy that was introduced in the early Soviet Union for 
non-Russians to represent the interests of their peoples in the Communist Party and in the People’s Commissariat of 
Nationalities. Hosking, Geoffrey. Russia and the Russians. (London: Penguin Group, 2012), p. 428. 
32
 Idem, p. 125. 
33
 Idem. 
34
 Brubaker, Roger. ‘Rethinking Nationhood: Nation as Institutionalized Form, Practical Category,  
Contingent Event.’ (Contention, 4.1, 1994), p. 7. 
35
 Benedict Anderson. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. (2nd  
ed. London: Verso, 1991). p. 6-7. 
36
 Idem, p. 7. 
37
 Anderson, Benedict. (1991), p. 11.  
38
 Brubaker, Roger, (1994), p. 8. 
39
 Idem. 
40
 Idem, pp. 8-10. 
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Brubaker also considers that “nationhood” is “institutionalized” in a cultural and political form 
(as ethnic nationalities were in the Soviet Union) and that “nationness” is an unforeseen event.41 
In Brubaker’s point of view, it is the external factors that instigate the formation of a nation and 
not internal (elites).
42
 He takes the constructivist idea of nation but adds a different perspective to 
it, instead of analyzing “what is nation?” he questions “how is nation institutionalized within and 
among states?”43  
 
The Crimean Tatars’ case complies with the assertion that nations are constructed by 
intellectuals and external forces (Soviet policy). However, since their identity was constantly 
fluctuating throughout different historical episodes, Brubaker’s theory on nation as a “contingent 
event” applies to the Crimean Tatar case that this nation is not just a constructed, developing 
entity but an ‘occurrence’ within the investigated time frame (1944-1994). The independent 
variables, deportation and repatriation take place in between this time frame. These variables are 
occurrences that have an effect on the dependent variable, the Crimean Tatar national identity.
44
 
These occurrences are researched because a nation that has lost its status quo and maintained the 
feeling of nationhood must have certain factors that keep a nation together. Brubaker’s 
constructivist approach is used to explain how this nation changed in the given time frame. The 
practical part of this research measures whether deportation and repatriation strengthened the 
Crimean Tatar national identity.  
Research methodology 
In this thesis, an inductive theory is used as a method in an exploratory research, in order to find 
out patterns and causal paths between the studied variables. To answer the research question, the 
relationships between the variables are further explored. The ‘deportation’ and ‘repatriation’ are 
independent variables and the dependent variable is ‘national identity’ (see Table 1 on the next 
page). The outcomes are gathered from qualitative data sources (policies, memoirs, letters, 
reports and samizdat documents). The exploratory factors are based on a timeline that begins 
                                                 
41
 Idem. 
42
 Idem, p. 10. 
43
 Idem, p. 6.  
44
 What is meant here by national identity is that ‘identities’ are socially and politically constructed. In other words, 
‘identity’ fits in a social category, membership, characteristics and national consciousness. Source: Fearon. James, 
D. and Laitin David, D. (2000). ‘Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity’. (International 
Organization, Vol. 54, issue 04, pp 845-877.), p. 847.   
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with the deportation of the Crimean Tatars from 1944 until 1994 (repatriation process). This 
study also provides a historical overview of the Crimean Tatars’ development of ethnic and 
national identity from the time before the deportation. However, some periods of history have a 
larger emphasis than others, to maintain a closer relevance to the issue. Similarly, the exploration 
goes beyond the repatriation process, into the situation today. Another contribution of this thesis 
is to make use of new materials to decipher how the national identity has been shaped by 
deportation and repatriation. Also, the constructivist approach is used to see if it still applies to 
the national identity today. 
 
Operationalization  
 
IV Deportation and repatriation > exploring > DV Crimean Tatar national identity 
 
Dependent variable (DV): national identity 
Independent variable (IV): 1) deportation and 2) repatriation 
 
Table 1 
Concepts Indicators Data source 
-Crimean Tatar 
national identity 
-Territory 
-Ancestry 
-Cultural traits 
-Values 
-National consciousness  
-Social and political position (before deportation) 
-Future goals 
-Memoirs  
-Reports 
-Deportation -Ethnic composition 
-Resettlement 
-Territorial deprivation 
-Population transfer 
-Soviet authorities’ position 
-Samizdat 
-Soviet policies 
-Memoirs 
-Reports 
-Repatriation -Migration 
-Resettlement 
-Reports 
-Interviews 
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-Place of origin 
-Repatriation laws 
-National movement 
-Competence of repatriation 
-Tension of interests 
-Letters 
-Documents 
 
To analyze these variables, it is necessary to explore them by using data sources. The Crimean 
Tatar national identity is analyzed mainly from human rights reports, memoirs, letters, Soviet 
policies, reports and secondary sources on Crimean Tatar history.  
 
Hypotheses: 
H1: Deportation of the Crimean Tatars strengthened their national identity. 
H2: Repatriation strengthened Crimean Tatar national identity.  
 
Research question: To what extent deportation and repatriation strengthened Crimean Tatar 
national identity? 
 
Causal paths:  
The deportation had caused the Crimean Tatar national identity to dissolve and the community to 
disperse across the Soviet Union. The nation became disintegrated and caused a national 
movement from Crimean Tatar supporters of the movement and activists. While being stateless 
and without national territory, the national movement maintained national consciousness among 
the Crimean Tatars. During the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the national movement 
activists induced the Crimean Tatars to repatriate to Crimea. The outcomes of this research 
measures to what extent the deportation and repatriation have influenced the national identity of 
the Crimean Tatars, and it will provide a better understanding of how the Crimean Tatars 
represent their national identity today.  
 
Possible validity threats 
In this qualitative research, there are several threats to validity. The validity threats come from 
data sources that are possibly biased. Primary data such as memoirs, letters and interviews 
  Julia Ilyina 
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describe the events from one perspective; the Crimean Tatars’ and those who supported them. 
Secondary sources that have been written during the Soviet Union are (to a certain extent) 
outdated, because researchers back then did not have much access to documents and archives 
and Western researchers that did not have access to the region. In addition, it is still difficult for 
researchers to analyze this timeline because the Soviet authorities did not consider the Crimean 
Tatars as a distinctive, ethnic group. This is why a large amount of data is missing. For instance, 
the population measurement of the Crimean Tatars does not exist as a separate ethnic group in 
the second half of the Soviet Union, since they were calculated as part of the local population.  
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Chapter II: The traditional identity of the Crimean Tatars  
This chapter traces the establishment of the Crimean Tatars as an ethnic group and the relations 
with Tsarist Russia before the Soviet Union. It also provides context for Crimean Tatar national 
identity formation. Additionally, it becomes clear how external forces (political hegemony) have 
influenced the modernization (social and political aspects) of the Crimean Tatar population 
before the civil war.  
Ethnic heterogeneity in Crimea 
The ethnic composition in Crimea began developing between the 6th and 17th century. The 
Crimean Tatars claim to be one of the first settlers. The ethnic composition in Crimea derived 
from the geographic form of the Crimean peninsula. Most importantly, the Crimean ecosystem 
(the coast, steppe and the mountains) has contributed to attracting different peoples from 
different sides of the regions. The coastal area was an attraction for many European travelers and 
fishermen that had crossed the Black Sea and settled in the south of Crimea (Greeks, Goths, 
Adyghe, Armenians, Genoese, Italians, Alans and Venetians).
45
 The northern steppe (two-thirds 
of the Crimean territory) was a get-away for tribes and nomads. The nomads that migrated from 
the east to the steppe were Khazars, Mongols, Kipchaks, Huns, Schythians, Pechenegs and 
Sarmatians.
46
 Furthermore, the mountains were a place to hide if the steppe was too dangerous 
for the nomads. Yet how the Crimean Tatars have evolved into ethnic groups is still debatable. 
The problem lies in the fact that, according to European and Asian documentation, the ethnic 
composition of the Crimean Tatars has been discovered only since the formation of a state in 
Crimea in the mid-15
th
 century.
47
 Therefore, it is still undisclosed who were the primary 
indigenous population of Crimea, although historians agree that the presence of Tatars existed 
long before the establishment of the Crimean Khanate.
48
  
 
Consequently, these three main geographical regions created ‘territorial economic zones’.49 The 
ethnic tribes were divided along these zones. Greta Lynn Uehling, a post-doctoral Fellow in 
Ethnopolitical Conflict Studies, adds that even today, the Crimean Tatars can identify from 
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which parts of the region they descended in accordance with these zones.
50
 The ethnic groups 
that lived in the mountainous region were called Tats; they were growing tobacco or herding 
sheep. Those living at the coast were called Yaliboyus. They produced wine and handled fishery. 
The descendants from the nomads in the steppe were called Nogais. They were preoccupied with 
agriculture in the northern part of Crimea near the coastal area.
51
 From this we can deduct that 
the Crimean physical geography had divided the different groups, but also connected the diverse 
peoples from European and Asian lands to one place, the Crimean peninsula. At this point, they 
had no single ethno-national identity, but their identity was deeply intertwined with the land they 
lived on. Moreover, this ethnic compilation did not perceive the whole Crimean peninsula as a 
‘fatherland’ country; instead their patrie was either a village or a clan.52 In other words, their 
connection with the land was the center of their communal life. However, this identification of 
the Crimean Tatars was not always portrayed this way. Williams claims that the Soviet 
historiography has portrayed the earliest historical background of the Crimean Tatars as 
descendants from Mongolian tribes. Even though as mentioned above, the ethnic group is 
composed of all kinds of sub-ethnic groups.
53
 
 
 
Indeed, the Crimean Tatars have some Mongolian descendants. Yet the Mongolians were the last 
sub-ethnic group that migrated to Crimea. The Mongolians came to Crimea in the beginning of 
the 13
th
 century from the Golden Horde and integrated with the local population. In the 15
th
 
century, the Golden Horde disintegrated and established a Crimean Khanate, under a Girey 
dynasty, that settled to rule the Crimean peninsula, with its center in Bakhchisaray.
54
 The Turkic, 
Sunni Muslim population in Crimea was spread into clans under the ruling of the Crimean 
Khanate. However, each clan had representatives and Islamic leaders (imams and mullahs) that 
controlled different regions.
55
 According to Uehling, the Crimean Khanate system was quite 
unique, because its ruling was not autocratic. The system was based on a combination of 
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Ottoman law, Islamic law and Tatar law.
56
 Religion and territory were unifying factors of the 
population living in the Crimean peninsula.
57
   
 
The Crimean Tatars began with the first steps of the nation-building process when the Russian 
Empire annexed the Crimean peninsula in 1783.
58
 That is to say, there was no other unifying 
identity among the ethnic groups before the 18
th
 century. Another signifying identity was 
territory; the population in Crimea identified themselves with a specific location. Another factor 
that brings significance to their territory is the Crimean geographical location and the Islamic 
ruling in the peninsula. Crimea was very important to the Muslim world, as it came to be known 
as a dar al-Islam ‘the Adobe of Islam’, which means that it is a geographical territory where 
Muslims are free to practice their religion.
59
 Geopolitically, it was also a valuable place for the 
Ottoman Empire, because Crimea was the most north-western land where Islam was worshipped 
and therefore a borderland to the Islamic world.
 60
 Later in this chapter, it will become clearer 
that this territorial significance added value to the Crimean Tatar national identity.  
Russian annexation of the Crimean peninsula (Dar al-harb)61 
In 1783, the Russian Empire dissolved the Crimean Khanate rule and annexed the Crimean 
peninsula. Thus began a stagnation period of a hundred years for the Muslim Turkic population. 
This lasted until the Crimean Tatars finally began evolving into an ethnic polity. At the time of 
the colonial period, the Russian population conflicted with the daily lives of the Crimean Tatars. 
Problems arose, because the Russian settlers were Christian orthodox and they did not 
understand the Muslim ways of life. To emphasize, the Russian settlers were interfering with the 
Tatars’ “Islamic mode of existence”.62 Ultimately, the Russian settlers and the Crimean Tatars 
became more aware that they were completely different from each other, especially because of 
dissimilarities in physical characteristics and social activities (e.g. religion and traditions).
63
 As a 
matter of fact, Catherine’s policy towards Islam was relatively liberal and it allowed Tatar 
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nobility to even have some privileges, which were no different from the Russian aristocracy.
64
 
Although this might be true, there were witness accounts from foreign and Russian travelers who 
had seen bad behavior towards the Crimean Tatars. To demonstrate this, Evgenii Markov, a 
Russian liberal critic and novelist, during his expedition to Crimea, wrote his observation on the 
Russian relation towards the Tatars in his book “Essays on Crimea” (1884) (see original in 
endnotes): 
Enchanted by Crimea, I wanted to know, how my countryman behaves toward a Tatar; 
but he immediately discouraged me ...  “Very bad!” He said. “Living in the midst of a 
stranger... It annoys him that we take the first place; he needs to be slaughtered on our 
accounts; because he's nasty, he cannot be replaced by a Russian”. During the war in 
Sevastopol, a coachman said about the treason of the Tatars, as if they were an object, 
without a slightest doubt; in this case, he shared the sad confusion of public opinion of 
the whole of Russia. However, this view on Tatars is necessary for complete 
understanding of Russian peasant relations to non-Christian.
65
 
 
This is the most compelling evidence, based on Markov’s observations, of the negative behavior 
from Russian settlers towards the Tatars in Crimea. Similar relations existed in Western colonies, 
whereas Christian empires ruled and attempted to regulate the Muslim lands. For example, when 
British took over Malaysia, or when Austria took over Bosnia in the 19
th
 century.
66
 With this in 
mind, the colonial period in Crimea had caused the Tatars to migrate to the Ottoman Empire in 
large quantities, notably to seek refuge and obtain the freedom of religion in the Islamic lands. 
The Crimean Tatars had kept good relations with the Ottoman Empire. For this reason, the 
Ottomans were willing to offer refuge. Already in 1792, approximately 60,000 Tatars migrated 
to the Ottoman Empire
67
. The highest migration rate, however, took place after the Crimean War 
in 1853-56.
68
 According to Uehling’s findings, over 200,000 more Crimean Tatars fled Crimea.69 
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But in addition, there were many fatalities among these migrations because of the harsh 
conditions that came with fleeing over the Black Sea to Turkey.  
 
Problems occurred mostly because the Russian settlers did not trust the Crimean Tatars due to 
their close connections with the Turks, especially during the Russian-Turkish War (1806-1812) 
and the Crimean War. To prevent communication between the Turks and the Tatars during the 
wars, the Tatars were forced to migrate from the coast to the northern parts of Crimea.
70
 
Williams argues that the Russian military was even proposing to expel the whole Crimean Tatar 
community to Siberia.
71
 Conversely, Sheeny and Nahylo state that the plan was to send the 
Crimean Tatars to the Semipalatinsk province (Kazakhstan).
72
 Nevertheless, this was the first 
proposal to exile the entire Crimean Tatar population by a political hegemon for geopolitical 
reasons. As a result of large migrations and fatalities, the Crimean Tatar population became just 
one-third of the population. Before the conquest of the Russian Empire in 1783 the Crimean 
population was between 3.5 and 7 million
73
 (Russians and Ukrainians made 45% of the total 
population in Crimea).
74
 It is also important to realize that the strong believers were most likely 
to migrate to the holy lands of Islam in Turkey. Due to the annexation, Crimea became dar al-
harb, a place where Islam is not worshipped.
75
  
 
For those who were left behind in the Crimean peninsula, the living situation was severe. In his 
book, Hakan Kirimli explains that the established local (Tsarist) administration had almost 
completely excluded the indigenous population: “the newly organized Tavrida oblast included 
lands which had little or no ethnic, religious, and economic ties with Crimea or the Tatars. This 
would ensure the loss of Crimean identity, as the latter would become gradually diluted within a 
large and much more complex administrative body.”76 As a result, the annexation of Crimea was 
a large threat to the cohesion of the Tatars in the region. The large migrations, multiple wars and 
                                                 
70
 Williams, Brian.  (1997), p. 229. 
71
 Idem. 
72
 Sheehy, Ann & Nahaylo, Bohdan. ‘The Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans and Meshkhetians’. Report No.  
6. Third Edition. Report: Minority Rights Group. 1982, p. 7. 
73
 Williams, Brian Glyn. (2001), p. 68. 
74
 Idem, p. 7. 
75
 Williams, Brian Glyn. (1997), p. 228. 
76
 Kirimli, Hakan, (1996), p. 3. 
  Julia Ilyina 
 
 19 
Leiden University 
political hegemony of Tsarist Russia prevented any sort of unification of the Crimean Tatar 
society.  
National awakening 
After a hundred years of oppression from Tsarist rule, the Crimean Tatars gradually began 
forming a national identity. At the turn of the 19
th
 century, a “national awakening” took over the 
Muslim population in Crimea, the Russian Empire and beyond
77
. In her article, Uehling argues 
that the Russian Empire had then created more liberal conditions for the Crimean Tatars that 
gave space for the intelligentsia to grow.
78
 Hence in 1905, the Crimean Tatar national groups 
were forming to demand social, political and cultural rights.
79
 In addition, the Crimean Tatars 
understood the definition of ‘fatherland’ (vatan).80 They began to see themselves as a polity with 
a territory which they claimed to be theirs, because their ancestors had lived on this land.
81
 At 
this point, national consciousness was emerging among the Crimean Tatars through reforms and 
revolutionary ideas.
82
  
 
Ismail Bey Gaspirali 
One of the key contributors of national awakening among the Islamic ethnicities was Ismail Bey 
Gaspirali. A notable Crimean Tatar intellectual, Gaspirali re-evaluated the Islamic society under 
the Russian Empire and embraced modernism among his people. In other words, Gaspirali had 
found a way to change the fate of the so-called “backward Muslim population” by having led a 
modernist movement for the Islamic society.
83
 Ismail Bey Gaspirali (1851-1914), was a reformer 
who activated the nation-building process of the Tatars. Gaspirali introduced reforms to the 
Turkic nation after realizing how backwards the Muslim life came to be under the hegemony of 
Tsarist Russia.
84
  He worked as a journalist in Paris, travelled to Egypt, the Ottoman Empire and 
Muslim India. During his travels he studied these places and made comparisons between the 
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Islamic and Western societies. Henceforth, he discovered that European education and 
modernism should apply to the Muslim community in the Russian Empire.
85
 In other words, he 
promoted a different kind of education to the Muslim society with a European influence. It is 
important to note, that Gaspirali’s vision to modernize the Islamic world inspired the Crimean 
Tatar intellectuals and reformers.   
 
Political community 
By 1917, the Crimean Tatars organized into a political community in Crimea, with a congress - 
Kurultay and a political party - Milli Firka. For the first time, the Crimean Tatars established a 
national autonomy and a secular state in December 1917.  A constitution was drawn based on 
nationalism, liberalism and on Western-based democracy.
86
 If his creation of a unified nation did 
not happen, the Crimean Tatar community would be completely disintegrated because of such 
large migrations during the Russian annexation.  At this point, the Crimean Tatar community 
understood the concept of nation and identified their characteristics as being part of a nation 
(religion, land, language, rituals, etc.) and gained national consciousness.
87
 Yet the Crimean 
Tatar ‘official state’ only lasted for a short time, until the Bolsheviks overthrew Sevastopol in 
December 1918. The civil war had caused a power struggle among the Crimean Tatars and the 
Bolsheviks. Then, shortly after, the German forces overtook Crimea in April 1919, which lasted 
until November 1919 when the Red Army took over Crimea.
88
 The Crimean Tatars were split 
between the Red and the White armies. While Kurultay’s left wing fought on the Bolshevik side, 
the right wing escaped to Turkey. In October 1920, the Bolsheviks finally defeated their 
enemies. This brought a brief halt to the nation-building process of the Crimean Tatars.
89
 
 
In 1920, the Crimean peninsula came under Soviet power. In due time, Moscow sent Chekha
90
 
and the notorious Hungarian Communist leader, Bela Khun to Crimea. Ultimately, Bela Khun 
led the region into a bloody rule, fighting against nationalists, bourgeois and those who 
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previously fought with the opponent of the Red Army, which was the White Army.
91
 As a result, 
the population decreased to a large extent, as overall 120 000 people were killed. By 1923, the 
Crimean Tatars formed 25% (150,000) of the Crimean population. The total of Ukrainians and 
Russians formed 50% of the population (the rest of the population belonged to smaller ethnic 
groups).
92
 Under those circumstances, the Crimean Tatar culture also suffered critically because 
two-thirds of the Crimean Tatar intelligentsia was killed. In total, the Bolsheviks executed 
approximately 60,000 Crimean Tatars
93
. Furthermore, there was a famine that killed many more. 
Contemporary sources estimate, that from 110,000 people in Crimea who died from famine, 
about 60% of those were Tatars
94
. In addition, the cause of the famine was because there was 
famine in other parts of the Soviet Union. The Soviets sent foods and supplies from Crimea to 
those regions. In the meantime, an additional 50,000 of the Tatars migrated to Romania and 
Turkey.
95
  
 
The Milli Firka party was then outlawed and became known as the “counter-revolutionary” 
party. Additionally, the local Bolshevik governmental body refused to work with Tatar 
nationalist leaders and resistance continued among the Crimean Tatars.
96
 Thus, the turnout of 
this dispute was resolved by a Crimean Tatar communist, Veli Ibrahimov who was soon to be 
chosen as the representative of the Crimean Tatars. Ibrahimov suggested to the Kremlin that 
Crimean national autonomy should be established
97
. Even though the Bolsheviks did not favor 
this decision, in 1921 (October 18
th
), the Council of People’s Commissars proclaimed the 
establishment of the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (Crimean ASSR).
98
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Chapter III:  Soviet nation-building and -destruction paradigms 
The aim of this chapter is to trace the changes in Soviet nationality policy, from nation-building 
to nation-destruction. It will also look into the impact these policies had on the Crimean Tatar 
national identity that was already constructed prior to the Russian revolution. The changing 
powers of the political hegemonies (Tsarist to Soviet power) did not completely prevent the 
Tatars from nation-building. Despite of the fact that there were massive repressions against the 
clergy and the Tatar intellectuals caused by the Bolsheviks (during the invasion of the Crimean 
peninsula), the Tatars managed to upgrade their national status during the indigenization policy 
(korenizatsiia) in the 1920s. The Bolsheviks had recognized this small nation’s identity and 
helped restore their vitality. 
Sovietization of the Crimean Peninsula 
In the newly established Crimean ASSR, the Bolsheviks began developing a Soviet institutional 
base in Crimea. The nation-building decade of the 1920s was seen as the Golden Age by the 
Crimean Tatars. The reason it is called the Golden Age is because this period allowed the 
Crimean Tatars to expand their culture and have some political influence over the Crimean 
peninsula through the Soviet indeginization policy, korenizatsiia. Because the political 
community was secular before, it was easier for the Tatars to become accustomed to the Soviet 
policies. The Soviets also strengthened the Tatars’ language, non-religious traditions, history, 
etc…99 Additionally, the Tatar reformers from the Tsarist era believed that the Crimean Tatars 
needed modernization. In this state of mind, the reformers agreed to apply Soviet policies that 
would modernize the lives of Tatars.
100
  
 
At the Tenth Party Congress in 1921, a New Economic Policy (NEP) was introduced in the 
Soviet Union to rise again from the total breakdown from the civil war, to reintroduce a measure 
of stability in the economy.
101
 At the same congress the Soviet authorities began developing a 
new nationality policy, to create national or regional territorial autonomy and eliminate the 
backwardness of ethnic groups. The Bolsheviks had a big challenge in this process. How to 
attract nationalities to join the Soviet regime? Also, how to avoid the impression that the Soviet 
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regime was yet another Russian-oriented oppressive government? They needed to persuade the 
non-Russians that they would represent their interests. Therefore, the Soviet leaders actually 
promoted nation-building of the nationals within the next two decades.
102
 The Crimean Tatars 
were in fact recognized as the korennoi narod, the indigenous population of Crimea. 
 
The proclamation of 1917 “Muslims of Russia and the Orient”, states that the Soviets would 
restructure Tsarist repressive measures. This concerned Muslims’ national, cultural and religious 
life.
103
 Earlier, the White Guards attempted to suppress national leaders from gaining national 
autonomy. But the Bolsheviks used this opportunity to counter-weigh them. They promised them 
autonomy in national, cultural, religious and political areas. This was a method used to attract the 
non-Russians
104
. This gave them the opportunity to unify and create a national consciousness. 
For instance, the rising literacy rate allowed the Tatars to read about their national history and 
gain pride about their nation. The orientalists also helped the Tatars to revive their history. And 
most importantly, the Soviet state gave the Crimean Tatars the sense of territorial attachment by 
gaining regional autonomy.
105
 
 
The main advantage for national groups would be to obtain a status of Autonomous Republic 
within the Soviet state. Smaller nations would obtain the status of a regional autonomy. In 
Allworth’s studies and documents on the Crimean Tatars, he argues that Crimea could have 
obtained a Union status. Regarding the qualifications for union republic, it is a border land and 
the population reached the required amount (one million).
106
 The Crimean Tatars were hoping to 
represent Crimea and have it as Union Republic. But, according to Allworth, they were not the 
majority population.
107
 Therefore the Crimean Tatars would not represent the Union anyway, if it 
was established. Nevertheless, they were claiming Crimea to be their national homeland-
republic, a Crimean Tatar ASSR.
108
 The Crimean Tatars went on claiming, “Those who say that 
the Crimean ASSR was territorial and not national forget that autonomy did not occur without 
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nationality”. 109  This is where the misconception derived from, as Hosking explains. Stalin 
awarded every nation a territory in the “form” of an autonomous republic.110  
Destruction of the Crimean Tatar nation  
The Golden Age had ended with the execution of the leader Veli Ibrahimov in 1928. After 
Lenin’s death, Stalin began implementing new policies which became known as the Great 
Purges (1933-1939) to clear the national communist movements and nationalist bourgeois 
among non-Russians
111
. Most of the Crimean Tatar intelligentsia perished from the purges and 
barely any cultural leaders survived.  
 
The new policies have disfigured the social and political status of the Crimean Tatars. The Tatar 
language was changed from Latin into Cyrillic (1936) and as a consequence, the Crimean Tatars 
could no longer understand their literature.
 112
  Furthermore, newspapers and journals were cut 
down in large quantities. As a result, Tatar literature became “politically unacceptable” or simply 
“non-Soviet”.113 Consequently, the literacy rate dropped among the Crimean Tatars and their 
cultural heritage was slowly disappearing.
114
  
 
Fisher notes that, overall, the mass Tatar population, especially the peasants, did not benefit from 
the Soviet rule, and instead experienced more losses.
115
 Between 1917 and 1933 about half of the 
Tatar population in Crimea perished or migrated from the peninsula. In addition, the years 
between 1928 and 1939 were the most destructive, when about 40,000 cultural and political 
Crimean Tatar leaders were executed.
116
 Another 13,000 were deported because of 
dekulakization, a repressive campaign that was led against peasants that were considered class 
enemies
117
. Also, the collectivization process destroyed the Tatars’ overall economy.118 Insofar, 
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Fisher argues that no other nationality had ever experienced such losses in the Soviet Union. 
During this time, about half of the population was lost due to the deportations and executions.
119
  
Nazi German invasion on the Soviet Union 
The Second World War was a controversial time for the non-Russian population in the Soviet 
Union. Under the ‘Operation Barbarossa’ the German Wehrmacht entered the Western borders 
of the Soviet Union occupying most of Ukraine
120
. At this point, the German occupants seemed 
like liberators to many nationals. The Soviet nationals were forced to pick sides between the 
Soviets and the German invaders. But in most cases they could not voluntarily choose sides. The 
German invasion in Crimea arguably changed the fate of the Crimean Tatars.  
 
What made nationals consider changing sides with their enemy was because of Stalin’s purges 
and Russification policies. These had made the non-Russians feel threatened by the Soviet 
regime. Therefore, many decided to fight against the Soviets when the German forces invaded 
the Soviet territory.
121
 By October 11
th
, 1941 on their mission to invade the Soviet Union, the 
German armed forces took over most of the Crimean peninsula and remained there for almost 
three years until the Soviets recaptured the peninsula in April 1944.
122
 The reactions from the 
Crimean Tatars to this occupation were very diverse. Some kept their loyalty with the Red Army 
and joined the Soviet partisans to oppose the Nazi troops; Williams gives a rough estimate of 
about 20,000 to 75,000.
123
 According to the German record, about 9,225 joined the German 
battalions voluntarily or they were forced to join (it is twice as few as what other sources 
estimate).
124
 In fact, nationals that composed the majority of the population (Ukrainians, 
Byelorussians and Russians) also fought with the German battalions. Yet they were not deported 
like the Turkic speaking ethnicities. Hrynevych estimates that approximately 3.5 million people 
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(in the Soviet Union) were deported from their regions during the war, but only 1.3 collaborated 
with the Germans.
125
  
 
Indeed, several thousand of the Crimean Tatar nationals participated in the battalions that were 
led by the Germans. They joined the German battalions to protect their Tatar villages or they 
were captive and were forced to join. A written statement exemplifies how Germans were 
perceived by some Crimean Tatars. In a report from the Forced Migration Projects and the Open 
Society Institute, Shavki Anafiev states that the Germans were not a threat to them:  
 
 “Now I can say honestly – whereas before (the Soviet period) I couldn’t – that when the  
Germans came, we didn’t see them do anything horrible to my village. A few months 
after, they took away our collective farm’s boss and party organizer, and we never heard 
from them again. But other than that, the Germans did nothing to us… The Germans 
broke up the collective farms and redistributed the land. At harvest time, the Germans 
helped us gather the corps. Then one day the German commandant sent some trucks and 
we thought: That’s it – they are going to take everything and we are going to go hungry 
during the winter. But they only loaded nine trucks and went away”.126   
 
On the other hand, Williams contends that the Crimean Tatars did not voluntarily join the Nazis 
but they were forced to. The Crimean Tatars were considered as untermenschen (sub-humans) by 
the Nazis, because they saw them as Mongols. The Germans created a battalion of 20,000 
Crimean Tatars to use as a defense mechanism, a pro-Nazi legion. In fact, once the Nazis 
captured Soviet soldiers, then they were forced to join the legion or they would be instantly 
executed.
127
 Even the other Crimean ethnic group, the Karaim Jews had their separate legion that 
                                                 
125
 Hrynevych, Vladyslav. (2014), 31:43 
126
 Burke, Justin. Crimean Tatars: Repatriation and Conflict Prevention. (New York: Open Society Institute,  
1996), p. 15. 
127
 Williams, Brian G. ‘Doomsday – 18 May 1944:  The Deportation of Crimean Tatars and Its Aftermath” 
Crimea: Whose  Homeland? On the Occasion of the 70th Anniversary of the Deportation of  Crimean Tatars. 
Harvard University, Cambridge, U.S. 19 May 2014. Soundcloud file. Retrieved on June 09, 2014, from the 
Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University Website: http://www.huri.harvard.edu/events/conferences-
symposia/185-crimea-whose-homeland.htmlWilliams, Brian, G. (2014), 41:36. 
  Julia Ilyina 
 
 27 
Leiden University 
fought with the Wehrmacht.
128
 Thus, Williams makes a remark that there were more Crimean 
Tatars fighting with the Soviet partisans, than the Ukrainians in Crimea.  
 
It is difficult to estimate, to what extent the Crimean Tatars were political at the time, so far there 
is not a lot of evidence available on this issue. However, the Tatars were ultimately stuck 
between two superpowers. There were several reasons why the Tatars would have and did 
collaborate with the Germans. Nevertheless, it will become apparent in the next section that the 
reason behind the deportation of the Crimean Tatars was not only based on the arguments that 
they collaborated with the German Wehrmacht, but it was also a geopolitical reason. 
Deportation (Sürgün) 
This section will test the validity of the hypothesis that deportation strengthened Crimean Tatar 
national identity (H1). The Crimean Tatars were deported from their Crimean homeland on 19 
May 1944, shortly after the Soviets took over Crimea. The whole Crimean Tatar population was 
transported to special settlements in Central Asian republics where they were kept for twelve 
years. Among the 20 ethnic groups that were deported were Chechens, Karachai, Ingush, 
Kalymsk, Balkars, Volga Germans and Meshketian Turks.
129
 The decisions to deport these 
nations were kept in secret and the reasons behind these deportations are still in debate. The main 
cause was that Stalin and his compatriots proclaimed the Crimean Tatars as traitors of the Soviet 
Union for taking sides with the Germans. It seems that the communist leaders finally fulfilled the 
Tsarist long-lasting aspiration to have “Crimea without Crimean Tatars” which began with 
Catherine II.
130
 In other words, as mentioned in earlier chapters, the idea of having Crimea 
without the multiethnic population was already planted during the annexation of the Crimean 
peninsula by the Tsarist Empire.  
 
According to an “Open Letter from the Russian Friends and the Crimean Tatars” a samizdat that 
was written in 1968 stated the Crimean Tatars had fifteen minutes and others even less to pack 
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their belonging and prepare for their leave.
131
 As they were taken to the railway station, the men 
were separated and sent by cattle cars to Western Siberia
132
. The rest were transported by sealed 
trains to Central Asia. 
133
 In the “Open Letter” the author describes the journey:  
 
“It was a journey of lingering death in cattle tucks, crammed with people, like mobile gas 
chambers. The journey lasted three to four weeks and took them across the scorching 
summer steppes of Kazakhstan. They took the Red partisans of the Crimea, fighters of the 
Bolshevik underground, and Soviet and Party activists…”134 
 
In this letter the author describes that even the people that were loyal to the regime were all 
deported to the special settlements, among them were even war heroes. The Soviet dissident 
Ludmilla Alexeyeva claims that the women, children and elderly were transported to 
reservations in Kirgizia, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and the Urals.
135
 But the 
Crimean Tatar men who were still fighting at the front would be deported. Once the war was 
over and they were sent to Siberia where they would be separated from their families for about 
twelve years.
136
 The transportation itself caused many casualties from the lack of proper 
conditions, which caused 46.2%, 195,471 Crimean Tatars to perish within that same year.
137
  
 
But what were the main reasons for their exile in 1944? To accuse someone for treason is a 
powerful accusation with which to ‘justify’ a deportation. Pohl argues that Stalin had planned to 
deport the Crimean Tatars and nations from the North Caucasus already before the war.
138
 This 
means that the reason to deport the nation for “treason” was just an excuse. For one, this reason 
is not justified because other nationals, among them Russians and Ukrainians, also collaborated 
with the Germans and nothing happened to these nations. Was the deportation justified or was it 
purely to dispense of rebellious ethnic groups? Hrynevych argues that these deportations were 
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used for foreign policy. In addition, Hrynevych explains that “ethnic cleansing and deportation 
were used as tools long before the war, but during the war, they were an important instrument to 
[Stalin’s] policy”.139 As instruments the Tatars were used for security, but at the end of the war it 
was perhaps too risky to keep them in those borderland regions, to avoid any contact with 
Turkey.
140
 Like the Crimean Tatars, the other deported nations (except for the Volga Germans), 
such as the Meskhetians, were located at the borders. According to a Soviet dissident, Aleksandr 
Nekrich explains that the Volga Germans were already deported to the steppes of Kazakhstan in 
1941 to prevent them from having contact with the Nazi Germans.
141
 However, Williams 
revealed that Stalin was actually planning to go to war with Turkey in 1944 and take over two 
provinces that were once part of Russia but had been lost Turkey during the Russia-Turkish 
war.
142
 In addition, at the time, the Meshketian Turks that lived on the borderland with Georgia 
and they had nothing to do with the Nazis. Nevertheless, they were also considered traitors just 
like the Crimean Tatars.
143
 Cenghis Dagci, a Crimean Tatar novelist that had been exiled in 
England expressed his impression on the deportations in an interview (no date was mentioned): 
 
“The tragedy did not start only after the war (deportation), it had its beginnings in the  
Thirties. Thousands of Crimean Tatars were deported between 1930 and 1936. These 
people were not opposed to the regime, they were only interested in cultivating their land, 
their vineyards, and orchards. They were simple, innocent people living in an 
agricultural community… The charge that the Crimean Tatars betrayed their Russian 
comrades during the war was nothing but a pretext, a deliberate slander. Among all the 
people of the Soviet Union, including the Russians, the Crimean Tatars collaborated 
least”.144 
 
All the deported nations were part of a strategy to prevent them from making contacts with the 
enemies. Subsequently, the deported nations were scattered throughout the vast lands of the 
Soviet Union and the institutionalized nations were partially destroyed. However, in the next 
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sub-chapter reveals that the Crimean Tatars attempted to maintain their national consciousness 
despite of their traumatic experience. 
Twelve years in special settlements 
The deportation of the Crimean Tatars had marked the largest tragedy in their nation’s history 
and it remains a part of their national identity to this day. The repressions in the 1930s and the 
deportation had forced the small nation to restructure their weltanschauung.  Kul’pin argues that 
the outcome of the repressions and the deportation was a great loss in intelligentsia and those 
carrying the traditional culture
145
. In addition, Alexeyeva claims that their cultural presence such 
as items and belongings were distributed among the locals, reused or destroyed. Almost all the 
literature in their language was destroyed, mosques, cemeteries (e.g. tomb stones were used for 
construction).
146
 In addition, the names of public places in Tatar were changed to Russian. In 
other words, any sign of the Tatars’ former presence was eliminated.147 In an “Open Letter of the 
Russian Friends of the Crimean Tatars” from the Human Rights Group report states that the 
property from the Crimea Tatars was given to Ukrainian settlers: 
 
 “Everything was done to destroy all traces of the national life of the Tatars and the very  
memory of their existence. Houses were demolished, and orchards and vineyards were 
allowed to become wild and overgrown. The cemeteries of the Tatars were ploughed up, 
and the remains of their ancestors torn from the earth… Everything written and printed 
in Crimean Tatar was burnt – from ancient manuscripts to the classics of Marxism-
Leninism inclusive.”148 
 
Consequently, this destruction of Crimean Tatar cultural heritage was also a destruction of their 
history. Without a cultural heritage, an ethnic group, especially a nation, cannot identify its roots 
and its origins. Additionally, the Crimean Tatars’ history was re-written in Soviet books.149 
Sheehy and Nahaylo’s report argues that the second edition of the “Large Soviet Encyclopedia” 
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published in 1953 describe the Crimean Tatars as being constantly occupied with war and 
stealing goods.
150
 Unlike the second edition, the first edition of the Encyclopedia described the 
Crimean Tatar “cultural achievements” and how the Crimean Khanate suffered under the Tsarist 
rule.
151
 In this way, if a nation’s history and territory is changed, this means that the community 
loses its national identity. A nation cannot properly function once it fails to have a territory and 
knowledge about its history.  
 
The Crimean Tatars were kept in these settlements for twelve years until Khrushchev liberated 
them in 1956. At the settlements, the Crimean Tatar nation was, to a certain extent, non-existent. 
The Crimean Tatars were strictly not allowed to leave the designated areas.
152
 Those who 
attempted to return to Crimea got a prison sentence for 20 years. Families were torn apart and 
spread along other settlements and the deported were not allowed to visit even the funerals of 
their family members in other settlements.
153
  
 
What did this deportation mean for the Crimean Tatar nation? Their main national identification, 
territory, was taken away from them and consequently there was no territorial basis for their 
recognition. Sooner rather than later, the Soviet authorities ceased to recognize the deportees as a 
Crimean Tatar nation. A Crimean Tatar, SH. U. Mustafaev explains in an entry ‘Evolution of 
Self-Consciousness, View from Within’ that everything was prepared so that the Crimean Tatars 
would cease to exist as a nation.
154
 Mustafaev adds that even though this nation had lost all the 
main components that make it a nation, it managed to survive. For this reason, the Crimean Tatar 
ethnic polity began its battle to return to its homeland.
155
 The Tatars began mobilizing by sharing 
their collective memory from the traumatic experiences. An example of how the new generation 
experienced the deportation, N. Bijazova, remembers (Newspaper ‘Komsomolec Tatarii, 24 
December 1989): 
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“At our home in Bakhchisaray, there stood a lot of Soviet soldiers. Mother was cooking for them 
all days. Father was a communist, he managed the tannery factory. When the soldier came, 
mother was pregnant for eight months. Father began to shake… I packed all the things that came 
in front of my eyes. On the streets there were shouting, crying, and a mass of people. No one 
could understand anything. They were loaded on each other in wagons and for four days they 
did not open them. People were dying, travelling for 20 days, and those who arrived to 
Uzbekistan died from hunger. In the Kolhoz (collective farm) where we lived, until 1946, from 72 
Crimean Tatar families only 16 were left. We were living exactly under the trees. No one was 
going to feed the special settlers in Central Asia. The children were playing among the dead, 
since the morning dawn, many remained lying under the trees. I was told of a 10 year old girl 
whose mother died. She cleaned her and buried her herself.
156
  
 
This shows that the Soviet authorities did not provide with the proper circumstances in making 
sure that the deported people would be properly settled in the designated areas. According to the 
document from the Soviet State Defense Committee (GOKO) which was signed by Stalin, was 
not fulfilled in reality. Signed by Stalin on May 11, 1944 (before the deportation) these are a few 
excerpts taken from the document: 
 
- The special settlers are allowed to take as much as 500kg of things per family. 
- Narkomzdrav USSR in the hours of the agreement from NKVD USSR, shall have one 
doctor and two nurses per train with special settlers with an appropriate amount of 
medical supplies and take care that there would be a sanitary and medical service during 
the journey. 
- Narkomtor shall take care that every train with the special settlers would have a hot meal 
and boiling water every day.
157
  
 
According to reports and victims the resettlement did not happen the way it was transcribed in 
the document. It also mentions that there would be food delivered for two months to the special 
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settlers, but most were dying from hunger and also diseases (caused by severe changes in 
climate).
158
 
 
As soon as the Crimean Tatars “settled” in their new environment in harsh conditions, they 
began questioning why this nation was deported and when they would return to their 
homeland
159
. In this way, the Crimean Tatars began to build solidarity among themselves. The 
deportation of the Crimean Tatars could have disintegrated them, but instead it unified them even 
more. How did the Crimean Tatars maintain their nation consciousness? At first, the elderly had 
to pass on all their knowledge about their memories and traditions to the children. Second, 
according to Mustafaev, the Tatars were always prepared to return to their homeland. It even 
came to the point that marriages did not take place because they were waiting to wed in 
Crimea.
160
 Mustafaev describes his perception on the situation that the “homeland was a 
travelling star in this dark hell of special settlement”.161 To emphasize, the Crimean territory had 
a whole different meaning for the Crimean Tatars. It became part of their life-long goal to return 
to their homeland and it was their only hope to maintain their national identity. Their 
weltanschauung changed while living hundreds of kilometers away from their territory and 
living amongst people who saw the Crimean Tatars as traitors of the Soviet Union. But it also 
strengthened their social solidarity by working together to achieve their mutual goal. Kul’pin 
argues that because they could not count on the government they had to survive on their own, but 
the only way to survive (as a nation) was to protest against the government.
162
 One form of their 
strategies (not against the government) was to become highly educated. This was one of the 
modernization processes. An ethnic group becomes educated and therefore more self-conscious 
about its existence and its belonging to a group. It appears that the Crimean Tatars realized soon 
enough that education was the key to get them out of this situation. The Tatars were determined 
to educate themselves to such an extent, that allegedly before the Soviet disintegration, the KGB 
statistics showed that Crimean Tatars were the most educated nation in the Soviet Union.
163
 
Instinctively, the Tatars chose to become educated especially in Russian language in public 
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schools (instead of local language where the Tatars lived e.g. Kazakh, Uzbek and Kyrgyz.).
164
 
Even though the Crimean Tatars were not focusing on nation-building at the time, and there was 
a risk that their language would perish, they believed that after their returning to Crimea, they 
would continue their national traditions. Regarding the hypothesis, so far it is true that 
deportation in fact weakened Crimean Tatar national identity.  
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Chapter IV:  Crimean Tatar All-National Movement  
This chapter will elaborate on the national movement that occurred in the post-Stalin period until 
the disintegration of the Soviet Union. This period is significant to the Crimean Tatars because, 
for the first time, they were able to express their demands and become revolutionary through 
their national movement. From then on, their community could be considered an ethnic polity, a 
displaced ethnic group with political intentions to return to their homeland. The national 
movement sheds doubt on whether the first hypothesis is really false. This chapter will test 
whether or not deportation gradually became a factor that strengthened instead of weakened 
Crimean Tatar national identity. 
Khrushchev’s Secret Speech 
In April 1956, after twelve years of living in immobile condition, the entire Crimean Tatar 
population was freed from the restrictions. They could now live anywhere in the Soviet Union. 
The only exception was that they were not allowed to return to Crimea.
 165
 To emphasize, this 
was a turning point for the Crimean Tatars because they could reunite with their family and 
friends but it also instigated a counter-reaction against the Soviet authorities.  
 
At Khrushchev’s Secret Speech at the 20th Communist Party Congress in 1956, Khrushchev 
declared that all the deported nations were liberated. According to Khrushchev’s decree, the only 
ethnic groups that were not allowed to return to their homeland were the Meshketian Turks, the 
Volga Germans and the Crimean Tatars.
166
 In addition, according to Justin Burke’s report, the 
decree states that these nations were not allowed to return because they were still considered 
“guilty of collective treason”. Conversely, Khrushchev condemned the “concept of collective 
guilt” (national treason) for the other ethnic groups that were liberated at the same congress.167 
However, the Soviet authorities allowed the Crimean Tatars to publish their own newspaper “the 
Banner of Lenin” (Lenin Bayragy) in their own language (the newspaper would be censored 
anyway by non-Crimean Tatars). Yet this did not satisfy them, because they aspired to return to 
their homeland.
168
 Additionally, the decree also validated that their property will be confiscated 
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(although as mentioned in chapter three, most of it was already confiscated or distributed to 
Ukrainian settlers after the deportation).
169
 It also meant that if the Crimean Tatars wanted to 
receive a passport, they had to sign an agreement that states they reject their property in Crimea, 
and without this signature they would not obtain a passport.
170
  
 
Slightly before the congress, the Crimean peninsula was handed over to Ukraine on 19 February 
1954. The Council of Ministers of Ukraine and the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic 
(RSFSR) made an agreement to transfer Crimea from RSFSR to Ukraine.
171
 What this meant for 
the Crimean Tatars was that there were no potential discourses on returning the deported Tatars 
to Crimea. Instead, they were expected to assimilate with the local population where they lived. 
While being scattered all over the Soviet Union, they had no institution to support their national 
identity (or example there was no education provided in Crimean Tatar language). As a result, 
there was a danger that the ethnic group would be completely disintegrated. At the settlements, 
the older generation had to rapidly give all their knowledge about their traditions, norms and 
values, and most importantly the history about their land and ancestors to the young generation. 
This was the only way to carry on the national identity, since territory, literature and cultural 
heritage was out of their reach or destroyed. The youth understood that if they would not resist 
the injustices made upon them and their predecessors, then they would lose their national 
identity.  
Crimean Tatar All-National Movement 
The limited freedom of the Crimean Tatars gave them the opportunity to establish political goals 
and tasks on retrieving their right to return to their homeland. The fact that they could freely 
move around, obtain education (although not in their language) gave them enough time and 
space to mobilize. Already at the turn of the 1950s, they began forming a platform for creating a 
national movement.
172
 The movement began with a campaign to send petitions to Moscow. The 
new generation began combating for their ancestral land that they hardly remembered (or they 
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were already born in exile) but it was their communal memory and nostalgia of the deportation 
that forced them to protest.  
 
Justin Burke states in his report that 1961 was the first year when 120,000 Tatars signed their 
first petition and sent it to Kremlin.
173
 The following year, the first official group called “the 
League of Crimean Tatar Youth” was established. 174  At that time, the young Mustafa 
Dzhemilev
175
 was part of the group. Mustafa Dzhemilev is an infamous figure among the 
Crimean Tatars and Central Asians. He has been persecuted a few times for being an activist for 
the national movement during the Soviet Union and he has remained the representative of the 
Crimean Tatars until today.
176
 Almost instantly, the KGB disintegrated the league. The Tatars 
quickly became aware of the authorities’ power against collective movements and dissents. 
Consequently, the Tatars thought of specific strategies to protest against the authorities.  
Movement’s active period (1964-1969) 
Uniquely, the Crimean Tatar movement became a grass root movement.
 177
 In 1964, the Crimean 
Tatars organized a “rotating lobby” in Moscow.178 Peter Reddaway, a Professor in Russian and 
Eurasian studies, claims that there was no name or any structure associated with the lobby, and 
therefore it was more difficult for the authorities to capture the responsible ones. Those who 
appeared as leaders were sent to closed trials followed by a jail sentence. However, the purpose 
of this system of rotating delegates was that the KGB could not label a single person as a leader 
of the organization (until 1969).
179The delegates’ tasks were to inform and deliver letters to the 
Soviet authorities about the situation of the Crimean Tatars. Additionally they kept circulating a 
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samizdat
180
 called “Informatsiia”. The samizdat informed Crimean Tatars about the amount of 
letters delivered to the authorities and which particular authorities were dealing with a certain 
matter (related to the Crimean Tatar exile).
181
 The Soviets actually became aware that this 
movement might create a contagion within Uzbekistan and affect 8 million Uzbeks.
182
 What they 
feared the most was the rise of nationalism among the republics. Therefore, the Soviets tried 
their best to halt the Tatar movement. At this point the Soviet authorities sentenced several 
activists.
183
  
 
In the end, the structured lobbying actually paid off. General Pjotr Grigorenko was a Ukrainian 
national and a Soviet dissident who saw the injustices of the Crimean Tatars. He claims in his 
memoir that by 1967, eleven years of sending petitions, altogether about 200,000 Crimean Tatar 
adults signed 3,000,000 times on a couple of thousand petitions.
184
 This means that every 
Crimean Tatar participated in this national movement. The amount of petitions signifies that 
almost every adult signed at least fifteen petitions.
185
 The rotating representatives succeeded to 
meet with the senior party members altogether three times. Their main demand was for the 
Crimean Tatars to return to their homeland
186
. The demonstrations and petitions actually paid off 
and a decree was published in 1967 on the abolition of mass treason from WWII
187
. This decree 
meant that the Crimean Tatars achieved their political rehabilitation. 
 
The main disappointment was that the decree of 1967 did not mention Crimean Tatars per se, the 
Soviet authorities referred to them in their documents as “citizens of Tatar nationality, who were 
formerly living in Crimea”.188 Added to that were, the Tatars who previously lived in Crimea and 
were now “rooted” in Uzbekistan and other areas of the Soviet Union.189 But the Crimean Tatars 
were not willing to accept that their “new homeland” would be in Uzbekistan or elsewhere but 
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Crimea. Later it was clarified that the Soviet authorities did not give the Crimean Tatars the 
permission to return to Crimea. The decree also emphasizes that the Council of Ministers should 
provide assistance for Tatar nationalities in domestic and cultural spheres to satisfy their national 
interests.
190
 One document from a collection of samizdat documents retrieved from Budapest 
Archival Library, states that the revival of culture-building was in fact a fiction.
 191
 It only made 
it seem like Crimean Tatar language was taught in schools. In the document the author argues 
that the Crimean Tatar language and culture were degrading and it would be difficult to gain it 
all back because the new generation is being born in another territory.
192
 It is also interesting to 
see, how the Council of Ministers would be willing to support the Tatars’ cultural building if 
their national identity was not accepted in the first place?  
 
In an interview, the journalist Venera Yakupova asked Ayshe Seitmuratova to tell her story 
about why she became an activist for the Crimean Tatar national movement for the newspaper 
“Komsomolec Tatarii’ (September 9, 1990).193 Ayshe begins with saying that life has made her 
into an activist. But her main reasons were that she was constantly rejected.
 
Since her childhood, 
she tried to attend the national gymnastics and ballet schools but she was denied access. In 
higher education she took four entry exams and still denied access to a history department in an 
Institute in Uzbekistan. The director of the Institute claimed that no matter how many times she 
would pass her exams they would not let her in.
194
 Ayshe emphasizes that because of her ethnic 
background, she was not allowed to participate in public institutions. Similarly, according to 
Burke’s report, Mustafa Dzhemilev also could not have access to higher education and have a 
secure job at a factory.
195
 It appears that the Crimean Tatars were sometimes allowed to develop 
themselves in society, but it was not made obvious to the rest of the public that they were often 
not welcome in certain institutions. 
 
                                                 
190
 See original “Postonavlenie Presidiuma Verhovogo Soveta SSSR, O grazhdanah Tatarskoi nationalnosti, 
prozhivshyh v Krymu (5 September, 1967) in in Yakupova, Venera. (2002). Krymskie Tatary, ili privet ot Stalina! 
P. 146. 
191
 Fakt i sootvestvujushie vyvody in Sobranie Dokumentove Samizdata (SDS) (Collection of Samizdat 
Documents). HU OSA 300-85-11. N. 21-3 (1977).  
192
 Idem. 
193
 Yakupova, Venera. (2002), p. 35.  
194
 Idem. 
195
 Burke, Justin. (1996), p.26. 
  Julia Ilyina 
 
 40 
Leiden University 
An additional decree was published in 1967, stating that “the Tatar nationals, who formerly lived 
in Crimea, are allowed to live on all of the territory in the Soviet Union in accordance with 
legislation on employment and passport.” 196  Another interesting account, according to 
Reddaway, about 100,000 Crimean Tatars actually went to Crimea that same year because they 
misunderstood the wording in the decree from 1967 and thought they had the right to return. All 
those people were forcefully returned to Central Asia.
 197
 In the following decade the Soviet 
authorities chose 1400 Crimean Tatar families to legally settle in Crimea. But for the rest it was 
not possible to obtain official registration in Crimea that would allow them to live there.
198
 
Consequently, the Crimean Tatars did not find these decrees satisfactory. Therefore, in 1967 the 
Crimean Tatar delegates organized a meeting between the Soviet officials Andropov, Sholohov 
and Rudenko and the Crimean Tatars representatives to express their disappointment. However, 
the meeting did not meet the Crimean Tatars’ demands.199 In 1968, 1969 and 1970 the movement 
weakened significantly because of the infamous Tashkent Trials. About fifty closed trials and 
arrests were made of 200 of those involved with the national movement.
200
 Most of the 
movement’s leaders were sentenced; among them were Mustafa Dzhemilev and Ayshe 
Seytmuratova.
201
 
  
As a consequence from the decree and the trials, the Crimean Tatar national movement created a 
public demonstration in Moscow in 1968. This event caught the attention of Soviet dissidents 
and human rights defenders, as well as the Crimean Tatar diaspora and countries abroad.
202
 
Afterwards, the Tatars’ story was published in the most famous samizdat for human rights 
defenders. This was the first time that the Crimean Tatar problem reached more people, other 
than the Soviet authorities. The notes on the Tashkent Trials even reached London, England, and 
soon enough they were published at Alexander Herzen Foundation in Amsterdam, on account of 
Karel van het Reve.
203
 Mubeyyin Altan, an American Tatar activist (currently a director of the 
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Crimean Tatar Research and Information Center), argues that this breakthrough of samizdat and 
documents to the West has alerted the small Crimean Tatar diaspora (circa 7,000 people) in 
America to support the national movement. And they did so by establishing a National Center of 
Crimean Tatars.
204
 On the other side, according to Altan, Turkey (approximately four million 
Crimean Tatar descents reside in Turkey) did not give any support for diplomatic reasons until 
1991.
205
 According to an infamous samizdat, Chronicle of Current Events, the United Nations 
did not take any serious action to support the Tatars. The organizations that supported dissents 
the most were Amnesty International, Islamic Council of Europe, Minority Rights Group and the 
Tunisian government.
206
 
 
However, exactly this became a Crimean Tatar problem for the authorities because they realized 
that what they have been doing so far, does not work. First the authorities allowed a few Tatar 
families to move back to Crimea, but they were chosen for their non-activist behavior (as part of 
propaganda).
207
 Then a few cultural elements were sponsored such as a newspaper and a folk 
ensemble. In 1974 the authorities tried to make an administrative region for the Tatar in 
Uzbekistan and to give them autonomy in Uzbekistan, which would be called Mubarek 
Republic.
208
 Yet, this plan did not work because the Crimean Tatars did not show any interest. 
The KGB became more hostile towards the Tatars. Lastly, the KGB attempted to create a 
countermovement against the Tatars so their national movement would disperse. However this 
was unsuccessful because the national movement continued its course and did not disintegrate.
209
  
Analyzing tactics of the national movement 
It is essential to understand how the Crimean Tatars perceived themselves and portrayed this 
through their national movement. In 1969, several things happened that influenced the tactics of 
the national movement. First of all, what were their main aspirations and how were they going to 
pursuit them? The foremost goal of the Crimean Tatar national movement was to be able to 
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legally return to their homeland in Crimea and restore their government (Crimean ASSR).
210
 
According to the authorities, this was not possible because they disapproved them as a nation 
(‘Tatars who previously lived in Crimea’). This provoked the Tatars and it became a ‘Crimean 
Tatar problem’.211 The Crimean Tatars laid down some tactics on how they wanted to act as a 
national movement. In his article, Reddaway summarizes these tactics mostly from Chronicles of 
Current Events samizdat documents.  
 
First of all, the Crimean Tatars were very committed to the Soviet regime and they wanted to 
retrieve Crimean ASSR.
212
 Secondly, they concluded not to follow their ancestors and immigrate 
to Turkey (although other national movements, e.g. Meshketian Turks, demanded emigration in 
1969). They understood that otherwise, soon enough, the Crimean Tatar nation would disperse 
and eventually cease to exist. At this point religion was no longer the most prevalent factor of the 
nation. They also made sure not to emphasize their national movement on Islamic faith. 
213
 Their 
Islamic practice was in fact already fading because there were no religious institutions 
supporting it. According to Dzhemilev, their territory in Crimea remained a holy place for them, 
one way or another (despite of the fact that their Islamic traditions might not be allowed there 
either). Dzhemilev says, “Not a single thing can measure the holiness of the Homeland”.214 If 
this was not a good enough reason for the new generation, most importantly it could not refuse to 
fulfill the aspiration of the older generation that had suffered immensely from the deportation.  
 
Another method was to get attention from abroad. If the Soviet authorities do not respond to their 
demands, then reaching out to the United Nations could raise awareness and put pressure on the 
Soviet government. Subsequently, the national movement decided to have cooperation with the 
newly established human rights movement and other nationals who were also condemned. 
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However, their cooperation had to stay out of the secret service.
215
 Another important tactic was 
to avoid the usage of violence and use Soviet legislation and constitution to defend their cases.
216
 
The movement had to remain on a grass root level with no obvious leaders of the movement so 
there would not be anyone to prosecute. According to a letter from the Crimean Tatars to 
Gorbachev, they claim that dozens of letters were sent by the Tatars to all Soviet central 
editorials of newspapers and journals about the Crimean Tatar national problem. However, in 
none of the editorials were the letters published.
217
 Consequently, from all the rejections towards 
a legitimate return to their homeland, in this way the authorities actually strengthened and 
unified the nation.  
The first migrations to Crimea 
Since the most important delegates were arrested at the turn of 1960s the following decade was a 
deadlock for the Crimean Tatar national movement. When Gorbachev introduced his policies 
glasnost and perestroika
218
, the Tatars could finally reach their dream to return to Crimea.  
 
Shortly before the Soviet collapse, prominent Soviet dissidents, human rights activists and even 
writers, like Evtushenko and Okudzhava, tried to help the Crimean Tatars by writing letters to 
the Soviet leaders. One such letter was sent from a theoretical physicist, A. D. Sakharov (1921-
1989) to the General Secretary of the Communist Party, Leonid Brezhnev. Sakharov wrote about 
a Crimean Tatar martyr, Musa Mamut who committed self-immolation in 1978 because he was 
not permitted to register in Crimea, and was sent away to prison camp once he attempted to settle 
in Crimea.
219
 In his letter (written in 1979), Sakharov explains that Mamut aimed at obtaining the 
permission to live in the Crimean peninsula for many years. Mamut was rejected to register in 
Crimea and thus he violated the passport regulations (he was allowed to live elsewhere in the 
Soviet Union, but not in Crimea according to the passport regulations). He and his family stayed 
in Crimea which had cost him two years in prison. Afterwards he was again threatened to be sent 
to prison or deported to Central Asia. When a policeman was attempting to break into his house 
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to take Mamut into custody, he committed self-immolation.
220
 This letter describes a Crimean 
Tatar who was trying to return to Crimea and stay there. Mamut was among many other Crimean 
Tatars who attempted to settle in Crimea. This continued to exist and became even worse at the 
turn of the 1980s when thousands began returning to Crimea. Williams argues that those who 
have never been to Crimea were moving there because they still did not consider their home in 
Central Asia.
221
  
 
Sakharov therefore argues from a humanitarian point of view that the way the authorities handled 
the Crimean Tatars was an act of injustice. He wrote in his letter that “…the Crimean Tatars are 
being systematically rejected to residency and registration of purchased houses, and committing 
unlawful deportations, raids, convictions, destruction of homes, leaving the elderly and the 
children under the open-air...”222 Yet their aspiration to repatriate was not purely coming from 
nationalistic emotions, as mentioned earlier in the chapter, it was also based on the nostalgia 
from Lenin’s creation of the Crimean ASSR. From this nostalgia, the Tatars wanted to create a 
Crimean Autonomous Republic and establish an administrative unit coordinated by Crimean 
Tatars because they considered themselves the indigenous population.
223
  
 
In response to Mikhail Gorbachev’s new policies, perestroika and glasnost, the Crimean Tatars 
felt they had a chance to retain more attention to their problem. Especially at this time there was 
more access to reach the West. In July 1987, the Crimean Tatars made appearance on the Red 
Square, exposing banners “Motherland or Death” and claims for repatriation to Crimea in front 
of Western tourists and media.
224
 Subsequently, after this demonstration of 300 Crimean Tatar 
activists, the General Secretary of the Communist Party, Andrei Gromyko promised to create a 
commission that would deal with their demands. In 1989, the commission agreed for the 
Crimean Tatars to return to Crimea. And finally, the representatives established an organization 
called “Organization of the Crimean Tatar National Movement” (OCNM) with its leader Mustafa 
Dzhemilev that took charge in the repatriation process of the Crimean Tatars.
225
 Yet as soon as 
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the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991, there was no aid left for their repatriation because 
Crimea became part of independent Ukraine and policies changed. Additionally, Ukraine was hit 
with hyperinflation. In addition to that, the Crimean Tatars were returning to a land that had 
changed completely since they were exiled, and they were entering a new political and social 
environment that was not expecting their return. Yet again, the Crimean Tatars’ national 
consciousness had been developing throughout the post-Stalin years and it strengthened their will 
to return to their homeland. And thus their national consciousness became so vivid that circa 
250,000 Crimean Tatars left everything behind to fulfill their ‘obligation’ to return to their rooted 
homeland.
226
 Going back to the first hypothesis, it becomes clear that the answer is nuanced. 
While initially deportation did indeed weaken national identity, later it was the reason for the 
national movement to return to the homeland which resulted in strong national identity. So the 
first hypothesis is only partially false, meaning it is also partially true. 
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Chapter VI: Repatriation to Crimea (Vatan)  
This chapter will test the second hypothesis, whether repatriation strengthened the national 
identity of the Crimean Tatars (H2). This chapter evaluates the repatriation process of the 
Crimean Tatars What made the Crimean Tatars abandon everything they had in their new 
homelands (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) and migrate to Crimea? What 
was their perception of their territory after they returned to Crimea? Why did the rest of the 
Crimean Tatars remain in post-Soviet countries?   
 
In 1989, large migrations to Crimea began from all the deported nations. After the Soviet 
disintegration, the flow of Tatars migrating to Crimea was even more immense. Burke estimates 
that by 1989, approximately 38,000 Crimean Tatars already lived in Crimea. By 1993 about 
260,000 returned en masse but more than 100,000 remained in Siberia and Central Asia.
 227
 A 
recent report from the OSCE indicates that 266,000 Crimean Tatar returnees are living in Crimea 
(13.6%).
228
 Yet for those who are still willing to repatriate to Crimea, are prevented because of 
economic circumstances.
229
  
Reasons for migration 
The new generation had not set foot on Crimean land since they were born, but they learned 
about their ancestral traumatic past and about the mythical homeland in Crimea from their 
predecessors. Yet what made the new generation return to Crimea? The main reason behind the 
repatriation process for their nation was for the communal, historical memory and most 
importantly, returning justice to the deported peoples in 1944.
230
 Symbolically, it was also 
important for shaping the Crimean Tatar national identity. Ismail and Ays¸egu¨ Aydıngu¨n claim 
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that their birth place in Central Asia or Siberia was not their homeland, as they saw themselves 
as guests there.
231
  
 
However, Kulpin contends that 300 Crimean Tatar interviewees convinced him that the growing 
nationalism in their homeland in Central Asia had forced them to migrate.
232
 The growing 
ethnocentrism and nationalism in former Soviet Asian Republics instigated migrations of 
Russian-speakers and the Crimean Tatars that were never considered the rooted population of 
their newly established republics.
233
 In 1988, there were ethnic conflicts in Uzbekistan and in 
1989 there were conflicts in Kyrgyzstan, where pogroms were targeted against Meshketian Turks 
and Crimean Tatars.
234
 Such incidents were a sign for many other Crimean Tatars to move. 
Subsequently, the partial reasons for migration were the repulsions from Central Asia and 
attraction to Crimea as a historical homeland.  
 
Another important aspect to the repatriation process was that the leaders of the national 
movement had been preparing them for this migration several decades. Their leadership was 
successful because they convinced their people that a better solution for their revival as a nation 
would be to repatriate to their fatherland. It is important to note, that the repatriation process 
would not have been possible without the disintegration of the Soviet Union, as it became clear 
in the earlier chapters, the Soviet authorities could not permit the Crimean Tatars to migrate to 
Crimea. Yet what this repatriation also meant for the leaders of the national movement was a 
political opportunity for them.
235
   
Establishment of Mejlis 
Since their repatriation, for reviving their national identity, the Crimean Tatar leaders have 
established their own governmental bodies, the Crimean Tatar legislature, Mejlis (also called the 
executive committee) which serves as a representation of the Crimean Tatar people in Crimea. 
Their main function is the “elimination of the consequences of the genocide committed by the 
Soviet state against Crimean Tatars, restoration of the national and political rights of the Crimean 
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Tatar people, and implementation of its right to free national self-determination in its national 
territory."
236
 The Ukrainian government approved its legality in 1999 with a presidential 
decree.
237
 Their goals are to restore the status of Crimean Tatar language, establish religious 
institutions and install Crimean Tatar schools, etc.
238
 On March 20, 2014 the Ukrainian Rada 
formally recognized the Crimean Tatars as the “indigenous peoples of Ukraine”.239 However, the 
Russian population and the local Crimean government are calling to ban the Mejlis as a 
governmental body since the Russian annexation of Crimea (2014).
240
 Even so, according to RIA 
Novosti (Russian news) Putin does not recognize the Crimean Tatars as the indigenous 
population.
241
 Subsequently, since their return, the Crimean Tatars have not accomplished to 
become the titular nation of Crimea in their claimed homeland. What is more, the local 
population does not recognize them as a nation, but instead as an ethnic group. However, the 
Crimean Tatar leaders are still working towards political self-determination in the Crimean 
peninsula. 
Cultural identity  
Apart from ethnic conflicts, what are the outcomes in cultural identity from interacting with the 
local population in Central Asia? Based on their fieldwork, researchers, Ismail and Ays¸egu¨ 
Aydıngu¨n from Turkey suggest, that the Crimean Tatar cultural identity became hybrid from 
inter-ethnic relations.
242
 The leaders of the Crimean Tatar movement saw this inter-ethnic 
relation as a threat to the preservation of their cultural identity.
243
 Throughout the years in exile 
their cultural identity has been fading away while adopting cultural identities of other nations, 
mostly towards the Soviet Russian culture and language.
244
 In addition, Kulpin claims that the 
Crimean Tatar began to feel more European amongst their Asian neighbors, and he emphasizes 
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that the Crimean Tatars became an ideal example of a Eurasian nation based on these 
transformations
245
 Thus the Turkish scholars claim that the Crimean Tatar intelligentsia in 
Crimea attempt to revive their cultural identity to make their nation more unified. In the process 
of reviving cultural identity the Crimean Tatars have established 15 schools in their native 
language. However, Senior Policy Fellow, Andrew Wilson claims in his report that only 3% of 
the Crimean Tatar children are taught in their native language and only in the first years.
246
 
According to UNESCO heritage, the Crimean Tatar language is now formally an “endangered 
language”. 247  Wilson recommends that there should be about 80 Crimean Tatar schools. 
According to Ismail Aydıngu¨n and Ays¸egu¨l Aydıngu¨n, the Crimean Tatars created 
newspapers in their native language and they even made a Crimean Tatar TV channel but based 
on Wilson’s observations, the media is not well developed.248 In addition, the Crimean Tatar 
cultural heritage is neglected, and because there are constant ethnic conflicts in Crimea, their 
mosques and cemeteries are often being attacked.
249
  
Socioeconomic and political problems  
Most of the Tatars left their belongings and professions behind and moved to Crimea where the 
living standard was actually worse than where they came from in Central Asia. The largest 
problem was that Ukraine had no policies or programs for the migrations of Former Deported 
Peoples (FDP). At the time of large migrations after the Soviet collapse (1991-2001) the 
Crimean Tatars and other FDPs could not obtain the Ukrainian nationality. This issue caused 
further problems to have access to education, political representation, employment, health care 
and housing.
250
 Yet in 2001, a nationality policy was launched which made it possible for the 
FDPs to obtain a Ukrainian nationality. In addition, three programs were introduced focusing on 
the “adaption, integration and resettlement” of the FDPs.251  
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Concerning their professional status, persons with higher education and respectable employment 
would most likely work on farms and low-income interdisciplinary jobs because there were no 
jobs available for them on the peninsula.
252
 This was in the cases when they did find 
employment, but over half of the adult population could not find employment according to 1999 
and 2004 census.
253
 According to Kulpin’s investigation, about 85% of the returnees’ in 1994-
1996 claimed that their financial situation had worsened. Therefore it seems more likely that 
their migration to Crimea was not to gain economic prosperity. Nevertheless, they persistently 
kept on returning to Crimea. The large population of repatriates returning to Crimea had also no 
housing space for them. The desperate situation made them squat land where they built houses 
themselves, which caused a lot of disputes with the authorities. This situation continues today, 
according to OSCE there are circa 8,000-15,000 people squatting 2,000 hectares of land.
254
 
Official Ukrainian sources state that in 1999, about half of the Crimean Tatar population did not 
have permanent housing.
255
  
 
Regarding the second hypothesis, whether the repatriation strengthened the Crimean Tatar 
national identity, it appears to be true but the actual process of nation-building has proven to be 
quite slow and there are still some obstacles (political hegemonies) that prevent the Crimean 
Tatars to have the full freedom in constructing their nation.   
  
                                                 
252
 Yakupova, Venera, (2002), p. 22. 
253
 Zaloznaya Marina & Gerber P. Theodore (June 2012), p. 274. 
254
 The Integration of Formerly Deported People in Crimea, Ukraine. (2013). Research rept. The Hague:  
OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM). p. 12. 
255
 Idem. 
  Julia Ilyina 
 
 51 
Leiden University 
Results and discussion 
Before the deportation of the Crimean Tatars, the status of the Crimean Tatar national identity 
was a constructed community that was gradually developing its national identity (by the Crimean 
Tatar elites and the Soviet nationality policy).  
 
Yet the first analyzed independent variable, deportation, had caused a discontinuity to the 
developmental construction of nation. This had created an identity crisis. The Crimean Tatar 
national identity was undermined by the Soviet authorities after the deportation. Therefore, the 
external forces (Soviet authorities) had influenced the awareness of national consciousness even 
more than ever before. This can be identified as the “contingent event” of nationhood, where an 
external force has sparked the feeling of nationalism in a community, because its right to self-
determination has been confiscated. This occurrence had transcended into a national movement 
and stimulated the community to plan and confront ‘external forces’ in order to achieve their 
rights to self-determination. This national movement, in turn, strengthened their feeling of 
national identity even during their exile in the Soviet Union. This means that the first hypothesis 
is partially true. 
 
Secondly, the disintegration of the Soviet Union gave way to the repatriation process. The 
second independent variable, repatriation, shaped the Crimean Tatar national identity to revive 
their cultural, social and political rights. Yet they are still constructing their national identity, but 
this time, by the consolidated Crimean Tatar elite. Thus, this elite work with primordial ideas 
that they belong to the Crimean territory and that they are truly the indigenous population of 
Crimea. In addition, the new ‘external force’ (Russia) is now testing the Crimean Tatars and their 
established governmental body. They are questioning whether the Crimean Tatars are the true 
indigenous population of Crimea. The repatriation has proven that the feeling of national identity 
is strong because a large number of the Crimean Tatars moved from Central Asia to Crimea. The 
adaption in Crimea had caused many difficulties, but it did not stop them from nation-building. 
Now they are living in their ‘destined’ territory and they can strengthen their national identity. In 
this case, the second hypothesis is true.  
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Conclusion 
This thesis focused on the evolution of national identity of the Crimean Tatars during the Soviet 
Union. After putting the Crimean Tatar nation building process and national identity formation in 
context by tracing the historical background of their struggle, this research focused on two 
specific processes, both triggered in one way or another by the Soviet Union. The deportation 
and subsequent repatriation (after the fall of the Soviet Union) of the Crimean Tatars were 
analyzed in the context of their role in strengthening national identity. To this end, the thesis 
sought to answer the question, to what extent deportation and repatriation strengthened Crimean 
Tatar national identity? The two independent variables were proved partially true and true, 
respectively. The results point to the fact that it is tumultuous events like these, the deportation of 
a whole nation from its original homeland to other distant and dispersed locations, that can be a 
strong enough reason, the so-called ‘contingent event’ described above, that shapes an entire 
nation and the next 50 years or more of its existence.  
 
This analysis adds to academic research into ethnic groups, nation building processes, factors 
influencing national identity formation, displaced nations within the Soviet Union, and the effect 
of Soviet policies on national groups within its territory. Furthermore, it provides perspectives 
through which to assess current events and to better understand developments in Crimea by 
focusing the attention on the fate of ethnic groups like the Crimean Tatars within larger territorial 
units. After returning to Crimea, the Crimean Tatars embarked on a process to restore their 
government but that may become more difficult after Crimea was annexed by Russia for the 
second time. Now the Crimean Tatars are working on recollecting their ancestral cultural 
identity, which has been almost completely destroyed after their deportation. However, another 
question is, will the Crimean Tatars be able to remain in their traditional homeland and continue 
restoring their cultural heritage in the current situation? 
 
Therefore, following the results from this thesis and current events, future research should 
explore the current and future Russian influence on the Crimean Tatars, since Russia ‘re-
annexed’ the Crimean peninsula. Various Russian news sources predict that the Crimean Tatar 
governing body will be dissolved, or that their status of being the indigenous population in 
Crimea will be re-examined. Moreover, already two representatives of the Crimean Tatars have 
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been recently banned for entering the Crimean peninsula for another five years.
256
 What will the 
fate of the Crimean Tatar nation and their political stance in Crimea be is difficult to predict but 
it is definitely a fruitful arena for further research into the Crimean Tatar nation and in particular 
its national identity formation processes. 
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